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 Executive summary 
 
Introduction 
1. This is a summary of an evaluation of the Teaching (T) Funding Method, commissioned 
by HEFCE, and undertaken by SQW Limited.  This evaluation is intended to contribute 
to an evidence base to inform the proposed consultation on possible changes in the 
funding methodology.  The main fieldwork task was consultations with 28 Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) and Further Education Colleges (FECs) most of which 
were undertaken during January and February 2005.   
Key findings 
2. The majority of the T grant is awarded as a block grant and institutions have, in principle, 
considerable control over how the grant is spent.  This provides institutions with some, 
welcomed, flexibility.  However, they tend to see the Teaching Funding Method (TFM) 
as a budget constraint which they need to reflect in their internal budget allocations. 
3. The TFM generally facilitates prediction of teaching grant allocations by HEIs provided 
they are able to predict student numbers with some accuracy.  Some institutions, 
however, have experienced difficulties recently because of changes in various 
characteristics and parameters of the TFM. 
4. The changes from initial projections have been, in most cases, a relatively small 
percentage of an institution’s total T grant.  However, for most HEIs, with limited 
reserves, marginal changes in grant can force quite significant departures from plans. 
5. The tolerance band introduces an important, and widely welcomed, element of stability to 
the funding system.  However, a minority of those consulted felt the band should be 
narrower.   
6. The concept of supporting growth through Additional Student Numbers (ASNs) is 
acceptable to most HEIs.  However, some of those consulted identified difficulties with 
the way the system is implemented in practice.  In part, these reflect the recent focus on 
Foundation Degrees since many HEIs have decided not to offer Foundation Degrees.  But 
concerns were also raised in relation to: the management burden imposed by competitive 
bidding (separate bids in some cases) for capital funds; the timing of announcement of 
awards. 
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 7. The last HEFCE consultation on the TFM elicited views on the price groups and many of 
these points were reiterated during our consultations. 
8. There is a general preference for the special initiative funding to be minimised in order 
to: increase predictability; reduce bidding costs; and to give institutions greater flexibility 
over the allocation of T grant. 
9. Both the Part-time (PT) premium and Widening Participation (WP) funding are 
welcomed by almost all institutions.  However, institutions for which these modes were 
important were universally of the view that the funds did not meet the additional costs 
incurred.  It is, however, difficult to assess whether changes in WP funding would 
materially influence behaviour.  Many of the institutions which felt funding was 
inadequate are committed to WP and this is a major market for them.  Changes in funding 
are, therefore, unlikely to influence recruitment strategies.  However, the increases in 
funding have led to greater investment and are therefore likely to increase both the 
quality of student experience and assist in keeping retention rates high. 
10. The treatment of non-completion is probably the most controversial aspect of the TFM, at 
least amongst those institutions which are intensively involved in WP.  The problems 
which institutions identified include: the TFM provides no funding for students who, say, 
complete all but one module during the year; the institution may have added significant 
value which is ignored by the current TFM; the completion measure may be inconsistent 
with academic regulations which permit a student to progress to the next year even 
though they may have not completed a module.  One effect is that students with a higher 
than average propensity to not complete are viewed as high risk and, as a result, some 
institutions have become increasingly careful over the types of students they are seeking 
to recruit.   
11. For some institutions compiling statistical returns, and reconciling HESES and HESA 
returns, can be burdensome.  There was, however, little enthusiasm for basing T grant 
allocations on (earlier) HESA returns alone. 
12. Many of the issues already discussed apply to directly funded FECs.  There are also 
specific issues relating to these institutions, which in part derive from their relatively 
small scale.  In particular: limited scope to manage T grant as a block grant; no, or 
restricted access to, special initiative and capital funding.   
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 13. Those FECs with indirect funding arrangements have a different relationship to the TFM 
but it is an important consideration in negotiations with their Higher Education (HE) 
partner(s).  Franchise arrangements have been a key factor in WP and Foundation Degree 
developments, and we encountered quite diverse experiences during consultations.  There 
are examples of such arrangements working very well but also cases where the FEC 
believes it is gaining little, if anything from the arrangement.  The two key problems 
appear to be: a very wide range of payments from the HEI to the FEC, which have been 
documented elsewhere; and a lack of any real partnership in some cases.   
Conclusions 
Best use of public money 
14. A key principle of the TFM is that T grant is allocated as a block grant for institutions to 
decide on how it is spent.  The obligation is therefore placed on institutions to decide on 
the best use of public money and how learning experiences can be enhanced.  This 
flexibility is welcomed, and exploited, by institutions, but is also restricted by 
competition between institutions and the need to ensure that subject areas receive 
adequate investment.   
Diversity of provision 
15. The standard Unit of Resource (UoR) is the same for each institution within each cost 
band.  In this sense, the TFM permits diversity but it does not explicitly recognise the 
different costs of different provision.  The TFM does, however, directly reward diversity 
through some special funding elements and premiums.  Those for WP (and PT) provision 
have assisted HEIs for whom WP is an important part of their mission.  There is a 
widespread view within the sector that funding does not reflect the true costs of WP but 
they do represent an addition to resources for those engaged in WP.   
16. The premium for specialist institutions explicitly recognises, and sustains, institutions 
that have distinctive approaches to teaching.  However, this is restricted to a relatively 
small number of institutions.  Many other HEIs would also claim distinctiveness, and 
higher costs, which are not reflected in the TFM. 
Interests of employers and the Government 
17. Employers’ interests are not directly reflected in the TFM, although the most recent 
round of bidding for ASNs was mainly restricted to Foundation Degrees which require 
employer involvement and reflect their needs more directly. 
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 18. The TFM offers more scope to reflect government needs.  The TFM offers considerable 
scope to influence behaviour through changes in the price groups and the introduction of 
premiums and special funding.  However, any changes in these basic parameters reduce 
the predictability of funding which is one of the strengths of the TFM.  The premiums are 
potentially a means for the Funding Council to have a direct impact on institutional 
behaviour, but any increase in their relative importance means a reduction in the 
flexibility institutions have to implement their own strategies.   
To promote quality  
19. The TFM does not reflect directly any assessment of quality, other than that Quality 
Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) requirements should be met.  Quality 
factors enter indirectly, but it is difficult to see these as having a pervasive impact on 
teaching quality.  The TFM is thus largely reliant on the professionalism of the 
institutions.   
Openness 
20. It is difficult to see how the TFM could be more transparent and open.  The method for 
calculating allocations is well documented and has been the subject of a recent 
consultation exercise.   
Predictability 
21. Provided there are no changes in the parameters of the TFM and as long as institutions 
are able to make accurate projections of student numbers then funding is highly 
predictable.  There have, however, been recent changes in the TFM which have 
significantly reduced predictability. 
Fairness 
22. The key drivers in the TFM are student numbers and price groups, and these impose 
conformity in funding.  Variations, to a large extent, reflect positions in the tolerance 
band.  The main caveats concern premiums, but both small and specialist premiums 
account for a relatively small part of the total T grant.  
Limited burden on institutions 
23. We believe the TFM scores highly in this respect.  The main burden relates to the 
provision of HESES data, and later reconciliations with HESA returns, and most of those 
we consulted were comfortable with HEFCE requirements. 
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 Overview 
24. The current TFM is an attempt to resolve tensions, and sometimes conflicting objectives, 
in the system.  The Funding Council is responsible for ensuring that public money is 
spent effectively while at the same time promoting quality (in all areas of HE) and 
reflecting government priorities.  The Council has a limited statutory scope to act as a 
planning body, and the process for allocating T grant, therefore, permits institutions 
flexibility in how they spend the grant.  For reasons given elsewhere in this report this 
flexibility is restricted in practice, and there is also a tension between seeking to reflect 
government priorities and the scope for discretionary actions which institutions have.   
25. There are also important administrative considerations.  Many of the issues which HEIs 
identified during this study could only be resolved by a much more finely grained TFM 
which would, we believe, increase the burden on both the sector and the Funding Council 
of implementing the TFM.  In addition, more detail in the TFM implies less flexibility for 
institutions to manage their T grants. 
26. Our overall conclusion is that the current TFM has achieved a good balance of these 
various tensions and objectives with two main qualifications.  The first is mainly 
concerned with the way in which the TFM has been implemented rather than the 
parameters and structures of the method.  Specifically, changes in premiums and price 
groups have reduced predictability and created difficulties for some HEIs.  We note, 
however, that most of the problems identified in this respect relate to the most recent 
changes only; comparatively few consultations identified this as a systemic problem. 
27. The second qualification concerns detailed aspects, in particular the levels of WP funding 
and PT premium and the treatment of non-completion.  These were widely thought to be 
inadequate and/or problematic.  These issues are relatively more important to those HEIs 
which are recruiting non-traditional students.  
 
 v
 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 SQW was commissioned in December 2004 by the Higher Education Funding Council 
for England (HEFCE) to undertake an evaluation of the Teaching Funding Method 
(TFM).  This evaluation is intended to contribute to an evidence base to inform the 
proposed consultation on possible changes in the funding.  The objectives of the 
evaluation were to: 
• evaluate the extent to which the current HEFCE Teaching Funding Method has 
met HEFCE’s stated intentions  
• identify and evaluate the extent to which the current method has produced any 
unintended and/or undesirable effects on the sector 
• comment on any other issues arising in relation to the operation of the method 
that may be relevant to the development of the Council’s future policy on its 
teaching funding method. 
1.2 The evaluation was managed by a Steering Group of HEFCE staff as part of the more 
general review of the TFM which HEFCE is undertaking.  The steering group was 
advised by Jim Port of JM Consulting. 
1.3 Initial work involved a review of previous HEFCE literature, studies, consultations and 
evaluations and analyses of the statistics relevant to HEFCE’s funding for teaching.  The 
main field work began in mid January 2005.  Interviews were undertaken over the period 
up to the beginning of March with a sample of institutions and other stakeholders 
including: 
• HEIs with differing levels of research intensity 
• HEIs of different sizes 
• HEIs with differing levels of activity in relation to widening participation 
• pre and post 1992 institutions 
• specialist and non-specialist institutions 
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 • institutions that have been subject to rapid changes in teaching funding 
• Further Education Colleges delivering higher education funded directly by 
HEFCE 
• Further Education Colleges delivering higher education franchised through one 
or more universities 
• HEIs delivering Further Education 
• a range of stakeholder bodies such as the Association of Heads of University 
Administration , Association of Colleges, British Universities Finance Directors 
Group, Department for Education and Skills, Standing Conference of Principals 
and Universities UK 
• HEFCE staff. 
1.4 Consultations were undertaken with 28 institutions and, typically, involved face to face 
interviews with several different functions within each organisation including: 
• the Vice Chancellor/Principal 
• deputy Vice Chancellor/deputy Principal 
• registrar 
• finance director 
• director of learning 
• director of planning  
• deans of faculties/heads of departments 
• director of quality/information/statistics. 
1.5 These interviews with institutions were structured using a standard aide-memoire, sent to 
interviewees in advance, with an accompanying introductory letter from the Chief 
Executive of HEFCE.  Interviews with other stakeholders and HEFCE regional staff were 
structured using a separate aide-memoire.  We are most grateful to all those who gave 
their time, at short notice, in order to enable us to complete the work within the specified 
time frame.   
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1.6 During the course of the evaluation meetings were held with the Steering Group and with 
the client group.  The interim results and initial conclusions were discussed at a workshop 
organised by HEFCE in March 2005 which was attended by some fifty staff from the 
institutions visited during the fieldwork phase.  A short paper was prepared for this 
workshop and presentations were given by SQW on the initial findings and conclusions.  
The break out groups and plenary discussions provided an opportunity to test whether 
there were any other issues related to the TFM that had not been addressed and to 
validate the emerging findings and conclusions.  A draft report was submitted to HEFCE 
in the middle of March and this final report incorporates feedback from HEFCE. 
1.7 This report is an interpretation and analysis, by SQW Limited, of the views expressed by 
institutions during the evaluation.  These institutions have not had an opportunity to 
review the report prior to publication and the views expressed are not necessarily those of 
HEFCE.   
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 2 Outline of the Teaching Funding Method 
 
Introduction 
2.1 The majority of readers of this report will be familiar with the methods used for funding 
higher education teaching in England.  For those who are unfamiliar with the Teaching 
Funding Method (TFM) or who would like to check their understanding of it, we have set 
out a brief, simplified outline of the key features in this Chapter1. 
2.2 Funds are distributed by HEFCE to meet four broad aims: 
• to make the best possible use of public money 
• to recognise and encourage diversity in provision and in the range of students 
• to respond to the interests of employers and the Government 
• to promote quality in teaching and learning. 
2.3 The key features of the TFM are intended to incorporate:  
• openness 
• predictability 
• flexibility 
• fairness 
• efficiency.  Efficiency in this context refers to the burden imposed on Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) which should be as small as possible. 
Important elements of principle 
2.4 The TFM is used to allocate funds from a sum which is fixed in any given year by the 
Government.  The TFM does not therefore have any role to play in determining the total 
amount of funds available. 
 
1 A full account can be found in documents available on the HEFCE web site www.hefce.ac.uk.  See in particular, 
Funding higher education in England: How HEFCE allocates its funds, May 2004/23. 
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 2.5 Funds are provided to institutions in a block grant which they are able to distribute 
internally at their discretion. 
2.6 Grants are calculated largely on the basis of the number of students studying at any given 
institution. 
2.7 Other features of institutions, of the subjects they teach, and of the students themselves 
are introduced into the calculation in an attempt to make the final allocations meet the 
aims set out above. 
2.8 Special initiative budgets are set up from time to time.  These are also drawn from the 
fixed sum determined by the Government and are top-sliced before institutional grants 
are calculated.  A range of methods is used for the allocation of special initiative budgets 
to institutions. 
2.9 The block grant principle is intended to make it possible for individual institutions to 
meet their own missions and objectives, constrained, of course, by the total budget they 
receive.  Institutions do not always find that as straightforward in practice as the principle 
might imply.   
The grant calculation 
2.10 There are four stages to the grant calculation: 
• (1) A ‘standard resource’ is calculated for each institution.  This is based on the 
number of students in the institution plus subject related factors, student related 
factors and institution related factors. 
• (2) An ‘assumed resource’ is calculated for each institution.  This is the sum the 
institution was paid by HEFCE in the previous year, adjusted for inflation, 
assumptions about fee income and similar factors.  
• (3) The standard and assumed resources are compared and the percentage 
difference between them is calculated. 
• (4) If the percentage difference is less than plus or minus 5%, i.e. the assumed 
resource is within a 10% tolerance band of the standard resource, the 
institution’s grant is carried forward from one year to the next.  If the assumed 
resource falls outside this tolerance band HEFCE will take some action. 
2.11 In principle, the standard resource calculation takes into account the size of the institution 
and any factors it faces which have implications for its grant.  The assumed resource is 
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 largely derived from the income the institution has received in the past and, unless the 
assumed and standard resources are significantly different from each other, the institution 
can work on the principle that there is stability in its grant.  The grant will flow forward 
from one year to the next. 
The devil is in the detail 
2.12 At stage one, calculating the standard resource, student numbers are weighted according 
to four broad subject groups, referred to by HEFCE as price groups.  The price groups 
reflect broad differences in cost between subject areas.  Medical students, for example are 
weighted four times as heavily as Economics students.  The price groups ensure that 
institutions with heavy laboratory-based costs, or other subject-related costs, have, in 
principle, extra funding to take that into account. 
2.13 Student factors are also taken into account at stage one to reflect the extra costs incurred 
in recruiting, retaining and teaching students with different characteristics.  These include 
premiums for part-time students, for students on Foundation Degrees and for students 
studying courses which extend beyond the conventional academic year. 
2.14 Stage one also includes a calculation based on institutional factors.  Premiums are given 
to reflect additional costs incurred by small HE institutions (defined as institutions with 
1,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) students or fewer), by those HE institutions responsible 
for historic buildings, and by institutions located in London.  Specialist HE institutions 
(with 60% or more of their courses in one or two subjects only) are also given extra 
support through additional premiums. 
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 2.15 Stability or predictability in the grant is a major intended feature of the TFM.  The 
relationship between the assumed resource and the standard resource is the key factor.  
Where the two are close in size the grant carries forward.  When assumed resource is 
more than 5% greater than standard resource, HEFCE will adjust the grant so that it 
comes back into the tolerance band.  When the assumed resource falls below minus 5% 
of standard resource, the institution may be asked to adjust its student numbers.  
Institutions therefore focus on remaining within the tolerance band.  If they are near the 
bottom of the band, their ‘unit of resource’ (income per student) is low for their level of 
activity; if they find themselves near the top of the band their unit of resource is high for 
their level of activity.  All other things being equal, a high unit of resource is desirable for 
the institution, although some may want to increase total income by recruiting more 
‘fees-only’ students.  But, HEIs are anxious to avoid cuts in grant which occur when they 
move out of the top of the band.  The band is asymmetrical in that sense.  The penalties 
for moving out of the top of the band are more severe for the institution than those for 
falling out of the bottom. 
Other features 
2.16 In addition to the basic grant arrangements set out above, there are a number of other 
features through which grants are adjusted or allocated. 
Special initiatives 
2.17 HEFCE reflects changing government priorities by establishing special initiative budgets, 
which are top-sliced from the fixed sum determined by Government.  They reduce the 
amount of grant available for distribution by the formula described earlier. 
2.18 Special initiative funds are allocated differently depending on the particular project, for 
example, the recent initiative to establish Centres for Excellence in Teaching and 
Learning (CETLs) was allocated through a bidding process (and were additional, not top 
sliced from core funds), but widening participation funds are allocated according to 
measures of educational deprivation (which have changed during the life of the 
initiative). 
Additional Student Numbers 
2.19 The formula funding forming the core of the TFM is essentially retrospective.  It provides 
stability and is based on student numbers already in the HE system. 
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 2.20 Prospective funding is provided through awarding Additional Student Numbers (ASNs) 
to HEIs which bid successfully for them.  ASNs tend to be relatively small scale, and 
only around 35% of HEIs bidding are typically awarded additional numbers.  The 
additional numbers are sometimes restricted to particular subject areas or areas which are 
favoured for development such as Foundation Degrees. 
2.21 The significance of ASNs is that they add to the numbers which go into calculations of 
the institutions’ standard resource and provide real cash increases in grant income.  HEIs 
are able to take extra students at any time but will not receive extra funding for them 
(except for the fees paid by the students themselves) unless the extra numbers form part 
of an ASN allocation.  Such fees-only (home/EU) students therefore reduce the 
institution’s unit of resource – its average income per student – and may result in the 
institution moving out of the bottom of the tolerance band.  ASNs, conversely, allow for 
funded growth. 
2.22 Institutions which fail to deliver, over a defined period, additional student FTEs in line 
with bids will have the funding for shortfalls in students withdrawn.  However, 
institutions are not required to recruit additional FTEs to the same programme areas for 
which ASNs have been awarded and funds will not be withdrawn provided total FTEs 
increase in line with bids for ASNs. 
Completion 
2.23 Student numbers are clearly a key factor in the scale of an institution’s grant.  Institutions 
wish to stay within the tolerance band and to achieve a unit of resource which enables 
them to carry out their work effectively.  Expansion in the system is largely driven by 
Additional Student Numbers. 
2.24 Public accountability responsibilities require careful assessment of whether or not agreed 
student numbers are delivered (for which institutions send in an aggregate data return to 
HEFCE and an invidualised student record to HESA/LSC each year).  However, this is 
not as straightforward as it sounds.  Students may drop out of a course in one year and 
complete it the next, for example, or they may move from full-time to part-time study 
during the year.  As the characteristics of the student body become more diverse, and 
economic demands upon them change, it is difficult to define a typical student.  At the 
same time course provision and mode of study is becoming increasingly flexible to meet 
the needs of students.  Nevertheless clear definitions of students are required for grant 
allocation purposes. 
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 2.25 Currently institutions are funded for each student who completes the ‘contract’ s/he has 
entered into with the institution.  Students register for a course or programme of study.  If 
they complete their year of study they count as fundable students.  The definition of 
completion is that the student has either attempted (but not necessarily passed) the final 
piece of assessed work for each module on the course, or passed the modules in some 
other way.  Students who study during the year but fail to attempt the last assessment are 
not funded, unless they have already passed the modules for the course. 
Moderation 
2.26 HEFCE phases in changes in grant to institutions that would otherwise be affected by 
large fluctuations in income. 
Summary 
• teaching funds are provided in a block grant for each institution taken from a 
fixed sum determined by Government 
• funds are calculated on the basis of weighted student numbers plus specific 
institutional features 
• institutions aim to achieve an average unit of resource within a 10% tolerance 
band  
• special initiatives and additional student numbers provide opportunities for 
growth and work in new areas which reflect government policy priorities. 
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 3 The impact of the TFM on institutions: 
Overview 
 
Introduction 
3.1 As discussed in Chapter 2, the details of the TFM, and the way it has been implemented, 
have been major influences on its impacts.  However, it is important to understand how 
HEIs relate to the TFM at a more general level and this is discussed in the current 
Chapter.   
Block grant and internal allocations 
3.2 A key element of the TFM is that the majority of the T grant is awarded as a block grant 
and institutions have, in principle, considerable control over how the grant is spent.  
There is no requirement to allocate to subjects in the same proportion as the grant is 
calculated nor, indeed, to spend T grant on teaching and learning activities.  This does 
provide institutions with some flexibility to determine their own missions and strategies 
and this is universally welcomed, at least amongst the institutions we consulted.  
Nevertheless, all the HEIs we consulted reflect, to varying degrees, the TFM in their 
internal allocation models.  Few replicate the TFM exactly2, but most reflect closely 
student numbers and TFM price groups in internal allocations so that changes in student 
numbers3 and/or movement of subjects between price groups are likely to have a direct 
impact on schools4.   
3.3 Some elements are typically not replicated internally, in particular: 
• the tolerance band is not applied automatically, so that changes in student 
numbers generally feed into schools’ revenues.  However, as is discussed further 
below, institutions sometimes moderate the impact of unexpected changes in 
recruitment on individual schools 
 
2 All institutions, of course, retain some element of T grant centrally to cover institutional overheads.  Those we 
consulted either top-slice T grant prior to internal allocation or ‘tax’ schools/faculties after internal allocation. 
3 Central management will impose controls on recruitment of ‘fees only students’. 
4 ‘Schools’ is used generally to refer to whatever level budgets are devolved to: faculties; departments; and schools.  
Schools will often have discretion over how they allocate T (and other HEFCE grants) internally so that even if 
internal allocation models mirror the TFM, the final allocation of resources may still differ. 
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 • premiums, and other special funds, are not always passed on to schools as 
separate allocations, but instead consolidated into funding per student.  This is 
often the case with the WP funding, and sometimes also the PT premium.  The 
rationale is usually that WP is part of the institution’s mission across all 
programmes and would therefore apply equally to all schools.  In addition, the 
complexity of calculating WP funding on a schools basis is not considered 
worthwhile. 
3.4 Institutions can, and do, depart from the TFM and we encountered three main ways in 
which this happens 
• as mentioned above, temporary assistance to schools following changes in the 
TFM.  Some HEIs consulted, for example, did not implement the recent changes 
in price groups immediately even though internal allocations would normally 
dictate this.  Some will postpone, or reduce, funding reductions if student 
recruitment targets are not met.  In both cases the aim is to assist transition 
• subsidy for teaching programmes which are above average cost for the price 
group.  Several HEIs consulted claimed their teaching methods were distinctive 
and higher cost in comparison with similarly titled degrees at other HEIs.  In 
some cases there may be cross-subsidisation between subjects in the same price 
group, but in others the claim was more general, for example greater emphasis on 
lab-based as opposed to classroom-based teaching across all “Science 
Engineering and Technology” (SET) subjects 
• in part, related to the last point, provision of programmes which are ‘loss-
making’ on the basis of the TFM across the sector as a whole. 
3.5 We think it is fair to say that the Funding Council and individual institutions tend to see 
the issue of block grant and institutional flexibility in different ways.  The Council views 
the block grant mechanism as giving institutions considerable flexibility to provide 
subjects, and modes of delivery, in line with their missions and strategies.  Institutions 
tend to see the TFM as a budget constraint which they need to reflect in their internal 
allocations.  As is discussed further below, the real flexibility which institutions have 
depends on several factors, notably alternative income sources, but there are in practice 
quite powerful pressures on institutions to reflect the TFM. 
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 3.6 First, they operate in competitive markets for students.  A decision to allocate more than 
the TFM calculation to a given subject means, all other things being equal, allocating less 
to another.  If an institution continues to allocate less than its competitors to a given 
subject area it will become less competitive, probably first through a reduction in staff 
and facilities and eventually through student and other stakeholder perceptions of the 
quality of the programme. 
3.7 Second, the TFM is extensively documented and transparent and, while not universally 
understood, academic managers perceive a clear link between their school activities and 
the institution’s T grant.  This inevitably creates pressures within an institution to reward 
schools on a basis which reflects the TFM.  Central management’s role is to define and 
implement institutional strategies, but in large and complex organisations one element of 
this is to provide clear incentives to academic managers which are aligned with the 
constraints and opportunities which the institution as a whole faces.  There are, therefore, 
sound management reasons, as well as internal pressures, to reflect the TFM in internal 
allocations. 
3.8 These points illustrate some capacity for HEIs to invest in strategic priorities within the 
constraints of the TFM.  Their ability to do so is limited by competitive and other 
pressures described above but, obviously, also by alternative income sources.  Many 
consulted drew attention to the importance of research income, or more accurately 
research intensity, in relation to teaching.  Two points in particular emerged: 
• the ability to share resources, both staff and equipment, between teaching and 
research activities5.  This also enables research intensive universities to provide a 
distinctive type of education 
• access to substantial capital funding, most notably through HEFCE’s Science 
Research Investment Fund. 
3.9 History, however, is also important and those HEIs which have significant endowment 
income, and/or have comfortable levels of financial reserves have been better placed to 
implement their own strategies.  
 
5 It should be noted that some of the recent closures of science departments have been attributed to a failure to achieve 
a RAE 5 grade together with high teaching costs,  rather than student recruitment difficulties. 
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 Predicting TFM 
3.10 One of the strengths, in principle, of a formula-based funding method is the predictability 
it enables.  No funding method can be entirely predictable because institutional outcomes 
will depend on the total HE grant and its distribution between teaching, research and 
other activities.  In addition, since the total T grant is fixed in any year, the allocation to 
one institution will depend on the activities of all others to at least some extent.   
3.11 The current TFM provides for predictable outcomes because: 
• provided the assumed resource is within +/-5% of the standard resource, 
institutions will receive the previous year’s T grant together with any change to 
reflect real increases or decreases in the overall grant.  Institutions generally have 
a good idea of what the latter will be by the end of the previous calendar year to 
which the T grant relates 
• clawbacks in grant relate mainly to any failure to recruit target ASNs for 
institutions which remain within the tolerance band  
• the outcomes of the TFM are moderated by HEFCE to ensure that institutions do 
not experience radical decreases in grant on a year to year basis.  No institutions, 
for example, received a decrease in real T grant following the most recent 
changes to the TFM. 
3.12 Given this framework, and provided the TFM is stable, predictability in funding is largely 
a question of accurate prediction of student numbers.  Several of the HEIs we consulted 
had little difficulty in predicting their T grant, and some of those which did, 
acknowledged that this reflected weaknesses in predicting, and tracking, student 
numbers.  However, there are three points to make in this respect.   
3.13 First, predicting student numbers is far simpler for those HEIs with excess demand for 
student places – so-called ‘selecting universities’.  The main issue for these institutions is 
to ensure that they do not over recruit.  Admissions tutors have become quite expert in 
this respect, and it is relatively easy for these institutions to set and adjust offers in the 
light of applications so that targets are met.  Those institutions which are not facing 
excess demand find it more difficult to predict recruitment.  They are often seeking to 
recruit non-traditional students whose decision on whether or not to enter HE is subject to 
a wider range of influences than those entering straight from school, and their (non-HE) 
options are also wider. 
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 3.14 Second, the TFM has not been entirely stable, and various characteristics and parameters 
have been altered to reflect policy decisions.  Many of our consultations with HEI staff  
reflected the most recent changes and two of these in particular.  First, the recent changes 
in WP funding were widely expected, but there appears to have been a general 
assumption that this would be funded by an increase in total T grant.  The top slicing of 
‘core funding’, and the level of funding were not expected and led to a redistribution of 
shares in total T funding between institutions heavily engaged in WP and others.  To 
oversimplify, research intensive HEIs lost share and others gained.  The change coincided 
with a substantial increase in QR funding, with the benefits heavily concentrated amongst 
research intensive HEIs.  However: 
• while in aggregate, the increased QR was larger than WP funding, the increased 
QR was far from evenly distributed and some HEIs were disadvantaged by both 
the WP funding and failure to score highly in the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) 
• the increased QR funding was widely expected, and predictable, and had been 
built into planning assumptions.  Even those institutions, for which the QR 
increase outweighed the notional reduction in T grant, had been planning on the 
basis of a larger total HEFCE grant than they received.  For this reason, 
unpredictability caused problems, even though total T grant may have increased 
• similarly, some of those institutions which gained from the introduction of the 
WP funding could have planned its use more effectively with more prior 
warning. 
3.15 The third point was, we believe, less important in practice and concerns the introduction 
of the new price groups and changes in price group weightings.  Some HEIs complained 
that insufficient notice was given of the changes.  As was discussed above, since most 
HEIs reflect these groups in internal allocations the movement of subjects led to 
unplanned surpluses and deficits within schools.   
3.16 The changes in funding which resulted from changes in the TFM were, in most cases, a 
relatively small percentage of an institution’s total T grant.  However, for most HEIs, 
with limited reserves, marginal changes in grant can force quite significant departures 
from plans. 
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 Similar treatment of similar activities 
3.17 One of the stated characteristics of the TFM is that it seeks to fund similar activities at 
similar rates.  This does not mean the same rate for the same subject and effective units of 
resource can vary, in the main, because of6: 
• similar institutions at different points in the tolerance band 
• the specialist institutional premium, intended to reflect the different 
circumstances and cost structures of specialist institutions, and also that they 
have less flexibility than multi-faculty institutions to redistribute block grant 
between faculties/departments 
• small institutional premium, which reflects the higher overhead (per student) of 
small institutions. 
3.18 This is a complex area involving underlying policy rationales as well as considerations of 
equity between institutions.  The simplest issue to deal with is varying positions within 
the tolerance band.  In principle, two institutions with the same student intake could be 
receiving up to 10% difference in funding per student, and many of those we consulted 
could see no logic in such a wide variation.  At the same time, as is discussed elsewhere, 
the tolerance band is generally viewed positively, as a means of cushioning institutions 
from annual variations and introducing an important degree of stability into the system.  
We believe that the majority of institutions would prefer stability to ‘equal’ funding, 
although there are differences in opinion as to how wide the tolerance band should be. 
3.19 The other issues are more complex.  The Funding Council has recognised that some 
institutions are delivering a distinctive, and higher cost, form of teaching and have 
different institutional cost structures that could not be adequately reflected by applying 
the standard price groups and instead pays these institutions additional premiums.  These 
include: the conservatoires with their emphasis on one-to-one tuition and the costs of 
maintaining orchestras and performance spaces; some specialist engineering provision 
dependent on industry-standard equipment and facilities; and the additional costs of the 
college system and facilities at Oxford and Cambridge.  It is important to note what is not 
at issue here: that such provision does incur higher costs; and that it is high quality in the 
sense of fit-for-purpose. 
 
6 Other components of the TFM, such as WP funding and PT premium also lead to different effective UoRs.  However, 
these are student-based and the same student would attract the same funding wherever they are studying. 
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 3.20 However, unsurprisingly, these premiums have been questioned by other HEIs and while 
it is beyond the remit of this evaluation to make a judgement on these issues we think it is 
important to record the arguments.  They can be essentially classified in two groups.  
First, while many HEIs accept the principle of the additional funding they do not believe 
it has been applied equitably: 
• there is a specific issue in relation to conservatoires.  We understand that 
conservatoires attached to other HEIs do not receive the specialist premium, even 
though they face similar additional costs 
• other HEIs believe they could also offer higher quality and a more distinctive 
learning programme if they had access to similar resources. 
3.21 The second argument is a questioning of the underlying policy rationale, and more 
specifically the justification for public money supporting such provision.  The argument 
is that students, or their employers, rather than HEFCE should meet the additional costs 
although some would acknowledge that this would imply reductions in provision, and 
possible cessation, in some cases. 
Impacts on quality 
3.22 One of the TFM aims is to enhance teaching quality, but quality assessment does not 
enter directly into the calculation of T grant.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could, 
given the demise of subject review and absence of an overall metric for institutional 
quality.  The fundamental issue is that the TFM does not seek to define what constitutes 
high quality but instead leaves this to individual institutions to determine.  For some, high 
quality teaching is inextricably linked with research, and many in this group believe the 
TFM does not recognise the cost implications.  For others, quality is adding value to 
students who enter HE with non-traditional qualifications, and again many would argue 
this is not adequately reflected in the TFM.   
3.23 In practice, quality considerations enter the TFM, at best, indirectly in five main ways.  
First, the Funding Council can withhold grant if institutions fail to meet QAA 
requirements.  The system therefore seeks to ensure that minimum standards are met 
throughout the sector. 
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 3.24 Second, there may be indirect impacts through student demand.  The TFM is driven by 
student recruitment and perceptions of the quality of a course influence student choice.  
However, potential students do not, in general, have robust information7 on quality, and 
choice of information is heavily influenced by many other factors such as institutional 
reputation (which is not necessarily correlated with quality) and costs. 
3.25 Third, quality of provision is one criterion used in the allocation of Additional Student 
Numbers.  However, it is only one, and other factors have weighed heavily in recent 
bidding rounds.  In addition, ASNs represent only a marginal addition to capacity and 
many HEIs have not entered the recent competition because of the focus on Foundation 
Degrees. 
3.26 Fourth, the lower end of the tolerance band implies a minimum unit of resource, and 
corrective measures are taken if an institution moves outside the band.  To the extent that 
the UoR is correlated with quality, this represents an additional means of maintaining 
minimum standards. 
3.27 Fifth, through special initiatives, such as Rewarding and Developing Staff8 and the 
CETL.  These provide a means for the Funding Council to promote quality enhancements 
outside the core funding elements of the TFM.  
3.28 We also note that several HEIs consulted questioned the way the TFM dealt with 
institutions which had underperformed (there are elements of their arguments which are 
more general than quality alone).  Under the current arrangements, HEIs which under 
recruit significantly will move outside the upper limit of the tolerance band and will be 
forced to take corrective measures by the Funding Council.  However, the reductions in 
funding will be moderated, giving the institution some opportunity to recover its position 
and take remedial action.  Some of those we consulted felt that there were two problems 
with this approach: first, the institution was able to escape the full impacts of the 
consequences of its actions; second, moderation of the T grant means a diversion of 
resources from other HEIs.  They would have preferred an approach which led to the 
redistribution of funds from underperforming HEIs to those which had met their 
recruitment and other targets.  There is undoubtedly some logic to this argument.  The 
absence of, or reduction in, moderation would result in a redistribution of funds to 
 
7 The National Student Survey and Teaching Quality Information data may lead to better information in this respect. 
8 The potential benefits of the RDS initiative are not restricted to teaching and learning. 
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 strongly performing institutions and, some would argue, an increase in quality over the 
sector as a whole.   
3.29 However, there are two difficulties with this approach: 
• failure to meet recruitment targets, which is the main reason for exceeding the 
tolerance band, does not necessarily reflect poor quality.  It may indicate 
weaknesses in predicting student numbers but demand may fall short of 
expectation for many other reasons 
• perhaps more important, the Funding Council must consider the interests of 
students attending underperforming institutions.  Reductions in T grant could 
reduce the quality of their HE experience, whatever the impact on the sector as a 
whole. 
3.30 We note that the view of moderation described above was not universally held.  Some 
HEIs, including some which had not benefited from the safety net of moderation funding, 
felt that it was important to protect institutions in difficulties and that they should be 
given the opportunity to address any underlying difficulties.  
3.31 Our general conclusion is that the TFM is neutral so far as quality of teaching is 
concerned.  There is little in the method which gives a powerful incentive to enhance 
quality, which depends mainly on the professionalism of staff.  Equally, we have not 
been able to identify evidence which suggests the TFM provides incentives to drive down 
quality. 
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 4 Structure of the TFM 
 
Introduction 
4.1 As was discussed in Chapter 2, the detailed characteristics of the TFM are important and 
these are explored in the next Chapter.  These detailed characteristics, however, operate 
within a general framework which is discussed in this Chapter.  By structural aspects we 
refer to: 
• tolerance band 
• Additional Student Numbers 
• price groups 
• the balance between formula funding and special initiatives. 
Tolerance band 
4.2 HEFCE calculates a standard resource for each institution.  This is a notional calculation 
based on number, and type, of student and institution-specific factors.  It also calculates 
an assumed resource for the institution based on the teaching grant paid to the institution 
for the previous year, adjusted for various factors such as inflation, plus the TFM’s 
assumptions of student tuition fee income.  If the difference between the standard 
resource and the assumed resource is no more than +/-5 % then the previous year’s grant 
is carried forward. 
4.3 The tolerance band introduces an important, and widely welcomed, element of stability to 
the funding system.  ASNs, and changes in TFM parameters and premiums, complicate 
the picture, but leaving these to one side, if recruitment is within +/-5% of the previous 
year’s outcome then institutions will receive a constant grant apart from changes 
reflecting the overall grant from Government.  In this sense the tolerance band is a major 
strength of the current TFM and has enabled institutions to plan more effectively than 
would otherwise be the case.   
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 4.4 Management devotes substantial effort to ensuring that institutions remain within the 
tolerance band, although impacts, in terms of HEFCE interventions, are not symmetrical.  
Moving below -5% may lead to additional funding and/or a requirement to reduce student 
numbers.  The latter is obviously relatively easy to achieve, and institutions which are 
close to the lower limit are less likely to be in a position where they need to expand in 
order to cover overheads or otherwise exploit economies of scale.  Institutions which 
exceed the upper limit are subject to close scrutiny by HEFCE, and since rectifying the 
position invariably entails additional recruitment, face greater management challenges. 
4.5 Three main issues were identified during the consultations.  First, it would seem that the 
operation of the tolerance band is not always understood fully by all academic managers 
(as opposed to central management).  Several HEIs reported that schools sometimes 
believed that increases or decreases in recruitment would automatically lead to changes in 
institutional T grant.  In part this reflected internal allocation models, which do not 
replicate fully the tolerance band, and is more an issue for internal communication than a 
comment on the TFM.  However, we encountered one instance where there appears to 
have been a misunderstanding between central management and HEFCE.  The institution 
was awarded extra T grant because it had moved outside the lower limit of the tolerance 
band and it believed that these funds would be available on a continuing basis.  
Subsequent changes to the TFM meant that institution was brought back within the 
tolerance band without the need for additional funding leading to some short-term 
difficulties because the institution had been planning on the basis of a higher T grant. 
This example highlights the importance of clear communication between HEFCE and 
institutions over the basis on which funds are awarded. 
4.6 Second, several of those consulted felt that the 10% variation allowed at present was not 
appropriate, and the majority of these felt the band should be narrowed.  These were all 
institutions towards, and sometimes at the limit, of the lower end of the band.  Their view 
is that they are more efficient than institutions in the positive range of the band and that 
this efficiency should be rewarded by extra funding.  At the system level, they perceive a 
wide tolerance band as protecting HEIs which are failing to recruit to target and that 
public money would be better spent if resources were transferred to institutions with 
lower units of resource.  This argument can, however, be questioned on two grounds: 
 20
 • an institution’s position in the tolerance band only reflects relative efficiency if 
the parameters in the TFM are accepted as the actual costs of educating a student.  
In reality the TFM makes no pretence that this is the case and, for example, each 
price group applies to a wide range of subjects each with different costs of 
teaching.  In addition, even within the same subject, different institutions may 
teach in different ways to achieve different outcomes, so that unit of resource 
comparisons may not be helpful.  Nevertheless, for institutions teaching similar 
subjects in similar ways the unit of resource is a useful indicator of cost-
effectiveness 
• as was mentioned in the previous Chapter, redistribution from those at the top of 
the tolerance band could have an immediate impact on current students in these 
institutions, and the Funding Council needs to balance these impacts against 
seeking to maximise efficiency across the sector as a whole. 
4.7 We note that any narrowing of the tolerance band would inevitably lead to less stability 
in funding.  In particular, more institutions would exceed the upper limit which would 
trigger grant reductions and, if the band is to be meaningful, more frequent interventions 
by HEFCE. 
4.8 Third, a small number of institutions argued that the band should be widened.  In all cases 
these were institutions which had undergone structural changes in the sense of merger or 
expansion into, or retrenchment from, specific areas.  The issue appears to be that the 
structural change, even though there had been prior discussion with HEFCE, immediately 
placed the institutions above the upper limit and this triggered a HEFCE response as if 
the institutions had not changed but simply failed to meet recruitment targets.  We do not 
believe this is a reason for widening the band but it does raise the question as to whether 
sufficient consideration is given to recalculation of the standard resource (and therefore 
actual position in the tolerance band) and requirements for transitional funding following 
structural changes. 
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 Additional Student Numbers 
4.9 Funded growth is provided for through ASNs, which are awarded in response to 
competitive bids from individual or consortia of HEIs9.  ASNs are intended to reflect 
national priorities: 
• increasing the numbers of students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
• increasing opportunities for students 
• increasing vocationally-oriented provision 
• supporting the expansion of high quality in learning and teaching. 
4.10 The last round of ASN bidding was in 2003.  Bids were mainly restricted to Foundation 
Degrees, although some additional places in Social Work were also provided.  The 
concept of supporting growth through ASNs is acceptable to most HEIs, and it is 
recognised that it provides the Funding Council with a means of steering growth to areas 
which reflect national priorities.  However, some of those we consulted identified 
difficulties with the way the system is implemented in practice.  In part, these reflect the 
recent focus on Foundation Degrees.  Many HEIs have decided not to offer Foundation 
Degrees and, as a consequence, have had no opportunity to grow through funded 
numbers, but two other issues were also raised. 
4.11 The first concerns the process itself and encompasses a number of issues: 
• the competitive bidding process imposes a burden on the institutions and 
HEFCE’s figures indicate that, since 1997, only around 35% of bids have been 
successful.  Some institutions claim that it is difficult for them to judge their 
chances of success in advance 
• bids need to be made to separate funds for capital costs.  This further increases 
the burden on institutions, but also the risk since success in one bid does not 
guarantee success in another 
 
9 The framework for allocating ASNs is currently under consideration by HEFCE. 
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 • the results of ASN bids are announced in February, with recruitment scheduled 
for the next academic year.  Failure to meet FTE targets will trigger clawback 
arrangements under the TFM10.  Most HEIs consider this insufficient notice.  
Publicity material needs to be prepared and the course marketed, yet by February 
many school leavers will already have made their decision on what and where to 
study.  For this reason, some HEIs consider they, effectively, have only one year 
to deliver on ASN allocations.  One HEI visited also made the point that it is 
difficult to motivate staff to go through the process of course validation when 
there is no certainty that ASNs will be awarded, although it could be argued that 
this is a development cost which institutions should be expected to bear. 
4.12 The second point arises because of the way in which failure to meet ASN plans is treated 
by the TFM.  The clawback mechanism is triggered by total student numbers, i.e. 
previous numbers plus any ASNs awarded, rather than simply recruitment to the ASN 
programmes.  This means that an institution can be penalised if it delivers the ASN 
programme bid but experiences a fall in demand for other courses.  Conversely, it would 
not be penalised if it failed to meet ASN targets but recruited additional students to other 
courses.  The rationale is that ASNs are intended to support expansion, in line with 
national priorities, in the sector rather than a diversion from one subject area to another.   
4.13 However, from the perspective of individual institutions this increases the risk of ASNs.  
The risk is further increased where HEIs enter into franchise arrangements with FECs.  
Typically, the FEC will require payment up-front, and the HEI may lose this payment if 
there is under recruitment.  The incentive may in fact be to reduce total FTEs prior to 
bidding for ASNs, although we doubt whether this would be logical, or feasible, in 
practice.  Some also made the point that ASNs are an opportunity for them to introduce 
new and innovative approaches to learning, since the tendency with established courses is 
to recruit to where there is a demonstrable demand for, rather than introduce innovation.  
As a result, some argued that funding for ASNs should be ‘ring fenced’ – institutions 
should be rewarded or penalised on the basis of delivering numbers in the ASN 
programmes bid for, and other changes in recruitment dealt with separately, subject to 
movement in or out of the tolerance band. 
 
10 Although institutions have the change to make good any shortfall in the following academic year. 
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 The price groups 
4.14 The last HEFCE consultation on the TFM, HEFCE 2003/42, elicited views on the price 
groups.  Many of these points were reiterated during our interviews  and we have not 
attempted to repeat them all here.  The concept of a small number of price groups was 
universally welcomed, and only one institution felt that there should be more than four11.  
This reflects the reduction in reporting demands that a small number of groups enables, 
but also a view that, in general, the relativities between groups and the placing of subjects 
within groups is broadly appropriate12.  Despite this, most institutions would prefer that 
the relativities were based on an explicit assessment of relative costs, although it was 
recognised that more progress would need to be made with the implementation of the 
Transparent Approach to Costing (TRAC) methodology to teaching for this to be 
feasible. 
4.15 The concern on the part of some institutions that the most recent changes to the price 
groups were introduced with insufficient warning was mentioned in the previous Chapter.  
The other main issue related to the classification of programmes, and was raised by a 
minority of those we consulted.  The issue essentially concerns different approaches to 
teaching programmes with a similar title, and more specifically the relative balance 
between equipment/lab-based and classroom-based approaches.  Some institutions have 
adopted approaches which differ significantly from the sector average in this respect.  
They believed that their approach implied that the programme, or more accurately part of 
the programme, should be placed in a different price group to the rest of the sector in 
recognition of the higher costs involved.  There is scope within the TFM to discuss these 
issues with HEFCE, but we were told that the Funding Council had become less willing 
to consider partial regrouping with the result that the TFM tended to impose conformity 
on curricula.  It is worth mentioning, however, that this was not a widespread complaint 
and did not relate to more than a few programmes in those institutions which did identify 
it as an issue. 
 
11 There is an issue concerning price groups and specialist institution premiums which is discussed in the next Chapter. 
12 This is not to suggest that institutions consider the absolute levels of funding to be adequate. 
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 4.16 We also note a specific issue which was raised during the consultations and that concerns 
the division of medical programmes between pre-clinical and clinical subjects.  The 
former being group B and the latter group A.  The norm has been to allocate students in 
the first two years of their programme to pre-clinical studies, and clinical studies 
thereafter.  However, our understanding is that pre-clinical and clinical training is, for 
professional reasons, becoming increasingly integrated and that the distinction is 
becoming meaningless in practice.  For those HEIs which train a cohort of students 
through pre-clinical and clinical studies this is not important, but some institutions 
transfer large numbers of students to other universities when they enter teaching 
hospitals.  This means that the university where the students first studied is incurring 
some clinical costs but only being funded at pre-clinical levels.  They are, however, 
forced to integrate both stages; otherwise their students would not be capable of 
transferring after the initial years of training. 
The balance between formula funding and special initiatives 
4.17 Alongside formula funding, HEFCE has made funds available for specific activities via a 
competitive bidding process.  These special initiatives are significant since they are one 
of the main means by which the Funding Council seeks to influence institutional 
behaviour in line with national priorities.  They are also potentially a way of addressing  
directly desirable characteristics of the TFM which formula funding does not; notably the 
quality issue where HEFCE has recently made significant funding available through the 
Centres for Excellence in Teaching and Learning initiative. 
4.18 These points are recognised, in principle, by HEIs, but there is a general preference for 
the special initiative funding to be minimised for a number of reasons.  First, the special 
initiatives create more unpredictability in funding for two reasons: 
• the funding is diverted from core formula allocations so it is more difficult for 
institutions to predict the total T grant and their likely share, should they remain 
within the tolerance band 
• the results of a bidding process are inherently unpredictable. 
4.19 Second, the bidding process imposes costs on the institutions.  This is especially the case 
in relation to smaller institutions which face high fixed costs of bidding, sometimes in 
relation to relatively small grants.  Some of the smaller institutions also perceive 
themselves to be disadvantaged in bidding since they cannot make available dedicated 
resources to prepare bids in the same way that larger organisations can.  The reporting 
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 requirements associated with special initiatives are also considered onerous and further 
add to costs. 
4.20 Third, special initiatives are seen to conflict with the general principle of a block grant 
which institutions decide how to spend.  As mentioned above, special initiatives are a 
diversion from ‘core funding’ but they are also seen to encourage mission drift.  There is 
a widespread view in the sector that teaching is under funded and individual academics 
feel under pressure to bid for resources even though they may not be closely related to 
key strengths and strategies. 
4.21 Finally, and in part related to the previous point, some institutions expressed reservations 
over the ways in which bidding processes had been conducted.  Specific reference was 
made to the CETL initiative which some institutions believed had been used to spread 
good practice rather than to reward and support excellence. 
4.22 Several institutions also expressed concern over the way in which special initiatives can 
be consolidated into the core grant.  Most comments were in relation to the Rewarding 
and Developing Staff (RDS) initiative and may, in part, reflect the way in which this was 
presented by Government as a real increase in resources for teaching.  The substantive 
point is that, because internal allocation models reflect the TFM, it is difficult for 
institutions to ring-fence funding for particular activities if the funding is consolidated 
into the formulaic core allocation.  Institutions have the authority to decide on internal 
allocations, but we reiterate the point that they may also wish to incentivise schools and 
establish clear links between T grant and school activities. 
4.23 The problems associated with special initiatives are recognised by HEFCE.  There is a 
general intention, not just in relation to teaching funds, to reduce the relative importance 
of special initiatives.  In addition, special funding programmes have moved increasingly 
away from bidding exercises towards formula based provisional allocations which allow 
HEIs to set their own priorities.  The aim is, in part, to reduce the burden of 
administration on HEIs. 
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 5 Detailed aspects of the TFM 
 
Introduction 
5.1 This Chapter considers some of the detailed aspects of the TFM under the headings: 
• timing 
• special funds 
¾ WP funding and part-time premium 
¾ specialist institutions 
• non-completion 
• statistical returns 
• Further Education  
Timing: notice and grant period 
5.2 The timing of funding announcements is, generally, as follows: 
• November, total funding for HE is announced 
• December, institutions provide information on current student numbers (HESES) 
which is used to calculate T grant for the next academic year 
• January, HEFCE decides the total T grant 
• March, T (and other) grant announced to institutions. 
5.3 The result is that institutions do not know with certainty what their T grant will be until 
around seven months before students are admitted.  Some considered this period of notice 
too short for effective planning, but the majority felt able to predict T grant, with 
sufficient confidence, further in advance.  To some extent, different views reflected 
whether the institution was experiencing excess demand for places or whether there were 
difficulties in recruiting.  But some institutions with no recruitment problems also felt 
that advance notice was insufficient. 
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 5.4 A more general concern was the annual T grant cycle combined with an academic 
planning cycle of two or, more usually, three years.  Almost all institutions would prefer 
a longer planning cycle but also recognise the constraints which government expenditure 
cycles place on HEFCE.  There were some exceptions, and a few institutions preferred an 
annual cycle, provided this responded to changes in recruitment between institutions. 
Special funds 
Part-time premium and WP funding 
5.5 These two funding elements are considered together because for many, but not all, 
institutions PT provision is an important component of the WP strategy.  The first point 
to make is that both sources of funds are welcomed by almost all institutions, as 
recognition of the additional costs which WP, and PT, provision generate.  Institutions for 
which these modes were important were, however, universally of the view that the funds 
did not meet the additional costs incurred.  Specifically: 
• the PT premium of 10% does not recognise the fixed costs of dealing with 
individual students such as student registration, tracking and support.  It is 
perceived as being based on the notion of an FTE comprising two PT students 
when, in reality, the headcount may be much higher 
• similarly, the WP funding substantially underestimates the additional costs of 
recruiting and retaining students13 
¾ institutions need to devote significant resources to marketing their 
courses and attracting non-traditional students 
¾ students require intensive support after entering HE 
¾ relationships with FECs are sometimes a key element of WP and these 
are costly to maintain, especially in relation to quality assurance.  Some 
HEIs consulted also drew attention to the high unit costs of maintaining 
FE networks in geographically dispersed areas with some FECs having 
small numbers of HE students. 
 
13 A recent study commissioned by HEFCE and others came to similar conclusions – The Costs of Widening 
Participation in Higher Education, Report to HEFCE, Universities UK and SCOP by JM Consulting Ltd.  (HEFCE 
R&D report) 
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 5.6 It is, however, difficult to assess whether changes in WP funding would materially 
influence behaviour.  Many of the institutions which felt funding was inadequate are 
committed to WP and this is a major market for them.  Changes in funding are, therefore, 
unlikely to influence recruitment strategies.  However, the increases in funding have led 
to greater investment and are therefore likely to increase both the quality of student 
experience and assist in keeping retention rates high. 
Specialist institutions 
5.7 Specialist institutions are defined as those for which at least 60% of (FTE) provision is in 
one or two subject areas.  These institutions are recognised as offering a distinctive form 
of HE which would not be adequately compensated for by funding at the standard price 
group levels.  Specialist institution premiums range from 0 to 240%.  The highest rates 
are, in general, applied to institutions focused on performing arts although some others 
also receive substantial premiums.   
5.8 The 60% cut-off is, of course, arbitrary but it does enable HEFCE to identify a relatively 
small group of institutions which are most likely to be offering distinctive programmes 
and to have different cost structures.  Those specialist institutions we visited are able to 
provide convincing arguments as to why higher rates of funding are required, but some 
non-specialist institutions questioned the rationale for, and other aspects of, the premium 
as was discussed in Chapter 3: 
• the premium reflects an implicit judgement that the higher costs of provision are 
justified by higher quality or meeting national requirements in some sense.  Some 
other institutions would claim that they also provide high quality or strategic 
programmes without special funding, and/or they would be able to do so given 
access to similar funding levels 
• unlike most other elements of the TFM, the specialist premium is negotiated and 
not transparent 
• as mentioned above, the stand-alone conservatoires receive the premium but 
similar schools within other institutions do not.  The rationale is, presumably, 
that such institutions have flexibility from the block grant to support the higher 
costs if they wish to.  However, as was argued elsewhere, institutional flexibility 
is restricted and the current system is also seen as inequitable.  But it is worth 
noting that this issue of comparability was not raised in relation to other subjects 
and may therefore be relatively unimportant across the sector as a whole. 
 29
 5.9 We believe there is logic to these arguments, but would note that an alternative approach 
would almost certainly require HEFCE to enter into negotiations with many institutions 
and to make judgements over cost, quality and national need.  Apart from the 
administrative burdens this would impose, it would imply a different relationship 
between the Funding Council and institutions than currently exists.  
5.10 There is some nervousness amongst, at least some, specialist institutions over the 
robustness of the specialist premium.  The current situation, for many, reflects 
negotiations over a long period during which they have demonstrated a case for special 
funding.  The nervousness arises because premiums are seen as vulnerable to changes in 
the TFM.  For this reason, some of those consulted would prefer to see specialist 
premium reflected in the core formulaic allocation.  However, it is difficult to see how 
this could be achieved without additional price groups, which would not be generally 
popular and could also increase the number of institutions eligible for the additional 
funding. 
Non-completion 
5.11 If students fail to complete14 the year of programme for which they are registered then 
they do not count in the TFM calculations.  If the result is to move the institution above 
the tolerance band, or a failure to meet student numbers when ASNs have been awarded, 
then there will be a clawback of T grant.  The definition of completion is that the student 
is assessed on the year’s programme or a specified number of modules.  The treatment of 
non-completion is probably the most controversial aspect of the TFM, at least amongst 
those institutions which are intensively involved in WP.  The problems which institutions 
identified include: 
• a student either completes or does not, so the TFM provides no funding for 
students who, say, complete all but one module during the year.  Institutions feel 
that this does not recognise the resources which they will have committed over 
the year 
• even though students may not complete the programme, the institution may have 
added significant value which is ignored by the current TFM 
 
14 See paragraph 2.25for the definition of completion. 
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 • the completion measure may be inconsistent with academic regulations which 
permit a student to progress to the next year even though they may have not 
completed a module.  This may be because aggregate performance on other 
modules is sufficient, or because some modules can be deferred. 
5.12 The TFM does, indirectly, reflect the problems institutions face with non-completion 
through the allocation of WP funding.  Since non-completion rates are, generally, higher 
for WP students it could be argued that WP funding recognises the increased costs 
associated with non-completion.  However, as was discussed above, most institutions we 
visited consider WP funding inadequate in relation to the extra costs they incur and, in 
addition, non-completion is not restricted solely to WP students. 
5.13 One effect is that students with a higher than average propensity to not complete are 
viewed as high risk and, as a result, some institutions have become increasingly careful 
over the types of students they are seeking to recruit.  This is seen as running counter to 
the WP agenda.  It has also been suggested that institutions have changed their 
assessment procedures to avoid penalties for non-completion.   
5.14 Several of those we consulted also pointed out that the incentive is to retain students on 
their initial programmes, even if it might be in the student’s best interests to enter another 
programme, or indeed to leave HE.  However, we saw no evidence that this was 
occurring in practice. 
5.15 As was mentioned above, the treatment of non-completion was a key issue for several of 
the HEIs consulted and all felt the TFM needed modification in this respect.  The main 
suggestions were: 
• more than one ‘census’ point so that a share of funding would be allocated on the 
basis of registration and additional amount on the basis of numbers completing15.  
Most HEIs recognised that completion per se was important, but objected to this 
being the sole criterion.  This approach was the most commonly advocated 
• funding by credits gained, although the administrative burden this would imply 
was acknowledged 
• define completion to be consistent with the institution’s academic regulations. 
 
15 There are similarities with the LSC approach where funding depends on registration, completion and gaining an 
award. 
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 Statistical returns 
5.16 At present, the T grant is calculated on the basis of Higher Education Students Early 
Statistics (HESES) survey for HEIs and the Higher Education in Further Education: 
Students (HEIFES) survey for FECs from the previous December.  The returns cover 
both existing students and projections of expected students and completion rates.  These 
figures are later compared with HESA returns data, when those figures become available 
at the end of the academic year.  Divergence in the two data sets, for example because of 
failure to recruit against expectations or different completion rates, can lead to 
adjustments in funding.  For some institutions, projections and later reconciliations can be 
burdensome, especially if there are large numbers of students beginning programmes 
after December, or a high proportion of students not enrolled full-time on three year 
programmes16. 
5.17 Institutions need to collect HESES data for their own internal management purposes, but 
we did explore whether there would be interest in moving to a system where T grant was 
allocated on the basis of HESA data.  This would lessen the reporting burden on 
institutions since, although they would still collect HESES data, reporting this in the 
HEFCE format, the high levels of accuracy required and the later need to reconcile with 
HESA data, all impose additional costs.  The obvious drawback is that T grant would be 
based on student numbers two years in the past.  There was, however, little enthusiasm 
for such a change for two main reasons: 
• most institutions have well developed procedures for HESES collection and 
projecting student numbers from this data; several spoke highly of the utility of 
the HEFCE software in this respect 
• funding would be increasingly disconnected from student numbers and, for 
example, improved completion rates would not be reflected quickly enough in T 
grant17.  More generally, the implications of moving in or out of the tolerance 
band would be delayed. 
 
16 The shorter the average programme length the greater the proportion of students moving in and out of the institution 
in a given year. 
17 The same point emerged from the last consultation on the TFM. 
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 5.18 Some institutions did, however, question the level of detail HEFCE required in the 
HESES returns.  Specifically, institutions are required to report on students funded by 
other agencies, for example NHS and TTA, in a different format to that required by the 
other funding agencies.  This added to reporting requirements and the rationale was 
unclear. 
FECs 
5.19 Visits were made to a small number of both directly funded FECs and those with 
franchise arrangements with HEIs.  The ways in which the TFM impacts on these FECs 
is quite different.  In both cases, however, the T grant, or revenue derived from grant, is 
usually a relatively small proportion of total funding.  As a result, the operation of the 
TFM is less important to the institution as a whole than is the case with HEIs. 
5.20 Many of the issues already discussed in this report apply to directly funded colleges.  In 
particular, reflecting the student markets they are serving, the adequacy of the WP 
funding and PT premiums was cited as a problem by many.  There are also specific issues 
relating to these institutions, which in part derive from their relatively small scale: 
• there is limited, if any, scope to manage T grant as a block grant 
• the FECs have no, or restricted access to, special initiative and capital funding.  
There is a concern that development activities are not undertaken to a satisfactory 
extent because responsibility for their support falls between HEFCE and the 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC), and sometimes other funders. 
5.21 Those FECs with indirect funding arrangements have a different relationship to the TFM.  
In one sense the TFM is not of direct relevance since its impacts are mediated through the 
financial relationship with an HEI.  However, the TFM is an important consideration in 
negotiations, although not always understood fully within FE.  Franchise arrangements 
have been a key factor in WP and Foundation Degree developments and we encountered 
quite diverse experiences during consultations.  There are examples of such arrangements 
working very well but also cases where the FEC believes it is gaining little, if anything 
from the arrangement.  The two key problems appear to be: 
• a very wide range of payments from the HEI to the FEC, which have been 
documented elsewhere.  There appears to be little logic to some of the variation 
which often reflects historical factors rather than varying inputs to development 
and delivery 
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 • a lack of any real partnership in some cases.  We encountered some cases where 
the HE partner, in response to its own recruitment difficulties, reduced the offers 
it was making to potential students in competition with the FEC and withdrew 
student numbers from the FEC at very short notice. 
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 6 Conclusions 
 
General aims for the TFM 
6.1 HEFCE has articulated four general aims for the current TFM18. 
To make the best possible use of public money provided for higher education so 
as to enhance the learning experience for students. 
6.2 A key principle of the TFM is that T grant is allocated as a block grant for institutions to 
decide on how it is spent.  The obligation is therefore placed on institutions to decide on 
the best use of public money and how learning experiences can be enhanced.  This 
flexibility is welcomed, and exploited, by institutions, but is also restricted by 
competition between institutions and the need to ensure that subject areas receive 
adequate investment.   
6.3 There are important aspects of the TFM, and the way in which it is implemented by the 
Funding Council, which help to ensure that money allocated to institutions is properly 
spent.  Institutions which move above the +5% tolerance band, and would therefore 
receive relatively high levels of resources compared with similar institutions, are subject 
to clawback of funds and particularly close scrutiny.  Institutions which move below the 
tolerance band may receive additional funding to remedy their position. 
To recognise and encourage diversity in the provision and delivery of higher 
education, and in the range of students 
6.4 The standard UoR is the same for each institution within each cost band (ignoring 
premiums and WP funding) irrespective of curricula and type of student, but institutions 
decide how and what to teach.  In this sense, the TFM permits diversity but it does not 
explicitly recognise the different costs of different provision.  In addition, a number of 
HEIs consulted felt that there was increasing pressure to place similarly titled 
programmes in the same cost band even when there were differences between institutions 
in the balance between lab- and classroom-based teaching.  This was felt to be reducing 
diversity in provision.   
 
18 As listed in HEFCE 21/96, Funding method for teaching from 1998-99 
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 6.5 The TFM does, however, directly reward diversity through some special funding 
elements.  Those for WP (and PT) provision have assisted HEIs for whom WP is an 
important part of their mission.  There is a widespread view within the sector that funding 
does not reflect the true costs of WP, but they do represent an addition to resources for 
those engaged in WP.  It is, however, doubtful whether these funds have led these 
universities to recruit more non-traditional students because this is their core market.  The 
way in which non-completion is treated is, however, widely perceived to increase the 
risks of recruiting non-traditional students and to work against the WP agenda.   
6.6 The consultations suggested that WP funding had encouraged some HEIs, which have not 
previously engaged with the WP agenda, to be more proactive.  The main impact, in this 
respect, has almost certainly been on the recruitment of well qualified and able students 
from non-traditional backgrounds rather than admitting students who may be less well 
prepared for HE.   
6.7 The premium for specialist institutions explicitly recognises, and sustains, institutions 
that have distinctive approaches to teaching.  However, these are restricted to a relatively 
small number of institutions.  Many other HEIs would also claim distinctiveness, and 
higher costs, which are not reflected in the TFM. 
6.8 Several of the comments above are also relevant to the question as to whether the TFM 
has encouraged diversity of programmes.  Students on Foundation Degrees attract a 10% 
premium, but there is a widespread view that this does not compensate for the extra costs 
of developing programmes in partnership with employers.  Some institutions also felt that 
ASNs should be awarded for progression after the two-year Foundation Degree.  As with 
WP, however, institutions have bid for Foundation Degree numbers because of their 
strategic fit, and the premium has increased investment in their development.   
6.9 We believe that the TFM may have inhibited the provision of innovative programmes 
incorporating features such as PT (and mixed mode) attendance, work-based learning and 
Accreditation of Prior Experiential Learning.  These modes are often, but not always, 
associated with WP, and the comments made elsewhere in relation to WP funding, PT 
premiums and the treatment of non-completion, are therefore relevant.  While some 
institutions are, nevertheless, engaged fully in WP the TFM encourages conventional 
delivery modes in relation to these students.  The main exception to this is e-learning 
which, in blended mode, has been developed by some institutions as a cost-effective 
method of delivery in some circumstances. 
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 To respond to the interests of employers and the Government 
6.10 Employers’ interests are not directly reflected in the TFM.  If the method has an impact 
in this respect it is through higher student demand for courses which generate high 
employment rates, and is therefore an indirect impact.  There is also the potential to 
reflect employers’ needs in ASNs, but these can have only a marginal effect unless 
numbers are concentrated on a specific profession.  The most recent round of bidding for 
ASNs was, however, mainly restricted to Foundation Degrees which require employer 
involvement and reflect their needs more directly. 
6.11 The TFM offers more scope to reflect government needs: it can influence behaviour 
through changes in the price groups and the introduction of premiums.  However, any 
changes in these basic parameters reduce the predictability of funding which is one of the 
strengths of the TFM.  The premiums are potentially a means for the Funding Council to 
have a direct impact on institutional behaviour, but any increase in their relative 
importance means a reduction in the flexibility institutions have to implement their own 
strategies.   
To promote quality in teaching and learning 
6.12 The notional UoR does not include any assessment of quality, other than that QAA 
requirements should be met.  Quality factors enter indirectly through student demand, to 
the extent that students have useful information on teaching quality and act on it.  The 
more direct levers are consideration of quality in the award of ASNs and the availability 
of funding through special initiatives such as CETL.  However, it is difficult to see these 
as having a pervasive impact on teaching quality.  The TFM is thus largely reliant on the 
professionalism of the institutions.  Given the absence of a metric for teaching quality 
there would appear to be little alternative, nor is there a demand for an alternative from 
institutions or stakeholders. 
Features of the TFM 
6.13 HEFCE has defined five key features for the TFM which are discussed in this section. 
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 Openness 
6.14 It is difficult to see how the TFM could be more transparent and open.  The method for 
calculating allocations is well documented and has also been the subject of a recent 
consultation exercise (HEFCE 2003/42). This does not mean that it is always understood 
fully.  Our interviews indicated that central management and services had, in general, an 
excellent understanding of TFM mechanics and the implications for their institution, but 
that academic managers were not always so well informed.  This is not necessarily a 
problem; the internal allocation/attribution models are of more importance to academic 
managers and the issue often concerns communication within an institution rather than 
openness of the TFM. 
6.15 The one caveat we would make concerns the calculation of specialist institution 
premiums.  These relate to only a small number of institutions, but they entail 
negotiations between the institutions and the Funding Council rather than a formulaic 
allocation.  The outcomes are, however, published. 
Predictability, so that an institution knows how decisions it might take, and 
changes in its circumstances, will affect its funding 
6.16 Provided there are no changes in the parameters of the TFM, funding is highly 
predictable so long as institutions are able to make accurate projections of student 
numbers.  However, there have been recent changes in the TFM which have significantly 
reduced predictability: 
• most important, the recent increase in WP funding which was achieved through a 
transfer from the ‘core’ teaching allocation.  This was not anticipated by 
institutions and created real difficulties in some cases 
• some institutions complained that the changes in price groups were introduced 
with insufficient notice. 
6.17 Both of the above led to relatively small changes in T grant for most institutions, and 
changes were moderated by HEFCE to ensure that real funding was maintained.  
However, marginal changes in funding can require significant changes in plans for many 
HEIs that do not have large reserves. 
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 Flexible enough to respond to external policy changes, particularly to 
developments in the Council's own policies 
6.18 The comments made in paragraphs 6.10 and 6.11 are relevant here.  We would, however, 
reiterate the point that reflecting policy imperatives in the TFM carries the danger of less 
predictability in T grants and reduced flexibility for institutions. 
Fairness.  Differences in funding between institutions will be for good and 
justifiable reasons 
6.19 The key drivers in the TFM are student numbers and price groups, and these impose 
conformity in funding.  Variations between institutions do exist but, to a large extent, 
these reflect positions in the tolerance band, and many of those we consulted felt that the 
benefits of stability in funding enabled by the tolerance band outweighed any drawbacks 
arising from differences in units of resource. 
6.20 The main caveats concern premiums, as discussed above in relation to specialist 
institutions, but there is also a very specific issue in relation to small institutions.  Oxford 
and Cambridge are allocated small institution premiums to compensate for the costs of 
the college system.  The arguments against this are similar to those in relation to 
specialist premiums – there may be higher costs but this is not a sufficient condition for 
higher grants.  However, both small and specialist premiums account for a relatively 
small part of the total T grant.  
The funding method will impose as small a burden as possible on institutions  
6.21 We believe the TFM scores highly in this respect.  The main burden relates to the 
provision of HESES data, and later reconciliations with HESA returns. Most of those we 
consulted were comfortable with HEFCE requirements. 
Summary conclusions 
6.22 The current TFM is an attempt to resolve tensions, and sometimes conflicting objectives, 
in the system.  The Funding Council is responsible for ensuring that public money is 
spent effectively while promoting quality (in all areas of HE) and reflecting government 
priorities.  The Council has a limited statutory scope to act as a planning body, and the 
process for allocating T grant, therefore, permits institutions flexibility in how they spend 
the grant.  For the reasons given elsewhere in this report this flexibility is restricted in 
practice, and there is also a tension between seeking to reflect government priorities and 
the scope for discretionary actions which institutions have.   
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 6.23 There are also important administrative considerations.  Many issues which HEIs 
identified during this study could be resolved only by a much more finely grained TFM 
which would, we believe increase the burden, on both the sector and the Funding 
Council, of implementing the TFM.  In addition, more detail in the TFM implies less 
flexibility for institutions to manage their T grants. 
6.24 Our overall conclusion is that the current TFM has achieved a good balance of these 
various tensions and objectives with two main qualifications.  The first is mainly 
concerned with the way in which the TFM has been implemented rather than the 
parameters and structures of the method.  Specifically, changes in premiums and price 
groups have reduced predictability and created difficulties for some HEIs.  However, 
most of the problems identified in this respect relate to the most recent changes only; 
comparatively few consultations identified this as a systemic problem. 
6.25 The second concerns detailed aspects and in particular the levels of WP funding and PT 
premium and the treatment of non-completion.  These were widely thought to be 
inadequate and/or problematic.  These issues are relatively more important to those HEIs 
which are recruiting non-traditional students.  It could also be argued that other aspects of 
the TFM impact differentially on this part of the sector.  They are, for example, more 
dependent on the T grant and thus less able to cushion the effects of changes, or to exploit 
the flexibility of the block grant.  It is, of course, the case that any changes in the TFM 
which favoured this group of institutions would be at the expense of others. 
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 Glossary and acronyms 
  
  
  
ASN Additional Student Numbers 
Assumed 
resource 
HEFCE grant for teaching plus assumed income from tuition fees. 
  
CETL Centre for Excellence in Teaching and Learning 
  
EU European Union 
  
FE Further Education  
FEC Further Education College 
FTE Full-time equivalent 
HE Higher Education  
HEFCE Higher Education Funding Council for England 
HEI Higher Education Institution 
HEIFES Higher Education in Further Education: Students survey.  The annual 
aggregate recruitment survey completed by FECs, which informs HEFCE’s 
funding for teaching. 
HESA Higher Education Statistics Agency 
HESES Higher Education Students Early Statistics survey.  The annual aggregate 
recruitment survey completed by HEIs, which informs HEFCE’s funding for 
teaching. 
LSC Learning and Skills Council 
NHS  National Health Service 
PT  Part-time 
QAA Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
QR Quality-related research - the component of  HEFCE research grant related 
to RAE performance and the number of active researchers 
RAE Research Assessment Exercise 
RDS Rewarding and Developing Staff 
 
   
  
Standard 
resource 
A notional calculation of what an institution would get if teaching grant was 
calculated afresh each year.  It is proportional to each institution’s FTEs 
weighted both by price group and by any student and institutional premiums 
which may apply. 
T grant  Teaching grant allocated through the TFM 
TFM Teaching Funding Method 
Tolerance band  +5 per cent to -5 per cent of the standard resource. 
  
UoR  Unit of Resource (teaching funding divided by FTEs) 
  
  
  
WP Widening Participation 
 
 
